Everyone gossips. It is an inherent social trait of human beings, despite tending to have negative meaning to most. In fact, two thirds of conversations are devoted to social topics (Dunbar 2004). It is one of the most common uses for language, and it may even be that language evolved primarily for this purpose. Because of its prominence in human function, it is essential to learn how gossip and spending two thirds of our time talking about others was selected for evolutionarily.
In order for a trait to be passed on and integrate itself into a genetic legacy, it must give its members an advantage of some kind. It is easy to see the selective advantage of claws for hunting, broader leaves for greater light absorption, or opposable thumbs for skilled tool use, but the advantages of language and gossip are less obvious. The answers to why we spend our lunch breaks chatting with Phil about his love life may lie with our primate ancestors and chimpanzee cousins.
Modern chimpanzees maintain close social groups of around 55. The group interactions are complex, and rivalries, wars, group splits, and high drama is common in the wild. Underlying the group actions of chimpanzees are the individual social actions, especially grooming. Chimpanzees spend as much as 20% of their time grooming one another. This time could be spent hunting or reproducing, but the complex social structure of primate groups demands that individual relationships be maintained through social grooming (Gazzaniga 2008).
As hominids evolved and grew bigger brains, specifically bigger neocortical size, their capacity for maintaining larger social groups also grew. But, the more members of the social group, the more people you need to groom to keep social order and the less time spent hunting and reproducing. Eventually, grooming became less selective because of the detriment to other survival needs, and this is where language began to take hold (MacLeod 2005). When maintaining relationships with 150-200 people (the maximum social group size of most humans), language becomes a much more efficient way to keep social order and still perform other survival tasks. Gazzaniga (2008) writes,
“If language began to substitute for grooming, one could “groom”, that is to say, gossip, while doing other things, such as foraging, traveling, and eating.”
The emergence of language as our method of grooming creates other problems, however. Language allows cheating or lying, as well as deception, interpretation/misinterpretation of meaning, and the need to understand others’ viewpoint. For the first time in evolutionary history, hominids have needed to “put themselves in the other’s shoes”. This may have led to modern homo sapiens’ theory of mind, the ability to ascribe mental states and other attributes to other people. It has also led to our ability to identify cheaters, deceive ourselves, and use language as a means to reproduce (flirting).
Works cited:
Dunbar, R.I.M. (2004).Gossip in evolutionary perspective. Review of General Psychology. 8(2), 100-110.
Gazzaniga, M.S. (2008). Human. New York, New York: HarperCollins.
MacLeod, M., & Graham-Rowe, D. (2005). Every primate's guide to schmoozing. New Scientist. 187, 10.
Monday, February 23, 2009
Brain lateralization and Interpreting Intentions
M.A. Goodale and A.D. Milner discuss the possibility of separate neurological processing streams for visual sensory information in A neurological dissociation between perceiving objects and grasping them. They present the case of a woman, D.F., who has brain damage ventrally in the lateral occipital region and parasagittal occipitoparietal region. They tested separate processing streams by using D.F. as a subject.
D.F. was asked to perform a series of trials that showed the remarkable difference in her ability to perceive object orientation and her ability to direct accurate movements with objects in differing orientations. Her results were compared to control subjects. In one instance, D.F. was asked to report the orientation of lines corresponding with orientation slots, as well as the orientation of blocks on a table. She had huge errors in verbally reporting these orientations, even confusing horizontal for vertical. In sharp contrast, when asked to physically place cards in slots, she performed with excellence, and showed behavioral signs of comprehending the object’s orientation and correct placement from the moment her hand began moving. In addition to simply orientation, object size and form were tested with D.F. In these tests, she had difficulty reporting whether white plaques of differing dimensions were different or alike (52% accuracy), but when asked to pick up the plaques, she showed strong behavioral evidence of knowing the object’s dimension, and did not differ from control subjects.
These results suggest “separate processing systems not for different subsets of visual information, but for the different uses to which vision can be put.” This means that there must be an area that processes conscious perceptual judgments separate from one that operates our automatic visuomotor processes that mediate skilled movements. This necessitates serious study not just of the visual/sensory inputs but also the patterns of output connections, processed internally within the brain and determined independent of visual information type. In other words, we need to look at what people mean to do with what they see, and not just study what they are seeing.
This undercuts those who believe visual information is interpreted and responded to only by the visual cortex and then sent to other brain functions as either spatial localization or object identification. There is clear evidence in this research of multiple, distinct brain areas that correspond with specific systems for processing different intentions associated with the visual information. This may even suggest that our brain has evolved to process our intentions as carefully as it processes our senses.
Further research since 1991 has been performed by a number of scientists. As one example, Clavagnier et al. (2000) assert further evidence for “functional subdivisions”. Their research focused primarily on the posterior parietal cortex. The numerous studies in this realm all point to the great degree of lateralization in the human brain. Gazzaniga (2008) discusses the lateralization of the human brain’s language centers: Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas, and suggests that this lateralization may be what makes humans truly unique from our primate ancestors. We not only need to process the phonemes of speech and how to recreate those sounds, but also their function and meaning. It is the toil of processing the semantics and pragmatics of language that has led to some of the unique lateralizations in the human brain.
Works Cited:
Clavignier, S., et al. (2000).Two systems of spatial representation: evidence from parietal lesions in humans. European Journal of Neuroscience. 12, 2.
Gazzaniga, M.S. (2008). Human. New York, New York: HarperCollins.
Goodale, M.A., & Milner, A.D. (1991). A neurological dissociation between perceiving objects and grasping them. Nature. 349, 154-156.
D.F. was asked to perform a series of trials that showed the remarkable difference in her ability to perceive object orientation and her ability to direct accurate movements with objects in differing orientations. Her results were compared to control subjects. In one instance, D.F. was asked to report the orientation of lines corresponding with orientation slots, as well as the orientation of blocks on a table. She had huge errors in verbally reporting these orientations, even confusing horizontal for vertical. In sharp contrast, when asked to physically place cards in slots, she performed with excellence, and showed behavioral signs of comprehending the object’s orientation and correct placement from the moment her hand began moving. In addition to simply orientation, object size and form were tested with D.F. In these tests, she had difficulty reporting whether white plaques of differing dimensions were different or alike (52% accuracy), but when asked to pick up the plaques, she showed strong behavioral evidence of knowing the object’s dimension, and did not differ from control subjects.
These results suggest “separate processing systems not for different subsets of visual information, but for the different uses to which vision can be put.” This means that there must be an area that processes conscious perceptual judgments separate from one that operates our automatic visuomotor processes that mediate skilled movements. This necessitates serious study not just of the visual/sensory inputs but also the patterns of output connections, processed internally within the brain and determined independent of visual information type. In other words, we need to look at what people mean to do with what they see, and not just study what they are seeing.
This undercuts those who believe visual information is interpreted and responded to only by the visual cortex and then sent to other brain functions as either spatial localization or object identification. There is clear evidence in this research of multiple, distinct brain areas that correspond with specific systems for processing different intentions associated with the visual information. This may even suggest that our brain has evolved to process our intentions as carefully as it processes our senses.
Further research since 1991 has been performed by a number of scientists. As one example, Clavagnier et al. (2000) assert further evidence for “functional subdivisions”. Their research focused primarily on the posterior parietal cortex. The numerous studies in this realm all point to the great degree of lateralization in the human brain. Gazzaniga (2008) discusses the lateralization of the human brain’s language centers: Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas, and suggests that this lateralization may be what makes humans truly unique from our primate ancestors. We not only need to process the phonemes of speech and how to recreate those sounds, but also their function and meaning. It is the toil of processing the semantics and pragmatics of language that has led to some of the unique lateralizations in the human brain.
Works Cited:
Clavignier, S., et al. (2000).Two systems of spatial representation: evidence from parietal lesions in humans. European Journal of Neuroscience. 12, 2.
Gazzaniga, M.S. (2008). Human. New York, New York: HarperCollins.
Goodale, M.A., & Milner, A.D. (1991). A neurological dissociation between perceiving objects and grasping them. Nature. 349, 154-156.
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Dead Dualism
Scientists have long understood reverence for the dead as being a behavior unique to humans. According to Gazzaniga, this behavior may be due in part to our dualistic tendencies. We unreflectively perceive that a particular human is more than just a body; there is something about each human that transcends the body—an essence. Common expressions like “beauty is on the inside” attest to our implicit beliefs that the abstract “person” has worth, and all corporeal qualities are accidental and irrelevant. At death even, the dead and dysfunctional state of the body does not take away from our hopes that the particular person will live on. In sum, dualistic beliefs in regards to the dead end up being quite religious.
When did this sort of dualistic reverence for the dead begin to happen? Ina Wunn argues that interpretation has become a problem when it comes to archaeological excavations, and archaeologists too quickly attribute significance to early burials. For example, many believe that in the Middle Paleolithic (150,000 to 35,000 years ago) Neanderthals and Homo sapiens participated in complex religious rituals. Because Neanderthals buried their dead in sleeping positions, and surrounded them by goat horns, stone tools, and skins, archaeologists speculate that Neanderthals may have had the notion that, because they are hunters in this life, they will still be hunters after they die in the next life (Joseph 2001). But Wunn explains that the Neanderthal man must have felt rage, mourning, and confusion at the loss of a beloved person, which could have induced the Neanderthal to affectionately handle the corpse. At most a hesitation to leave a loved-one, the Neanderthal burials by no means implicate a dualistic perspective or belief in the afterlife.
Another big research question has been about whether other species have elaborate reactions to dead con-specifics, which may mean we are not the only dualists. Of course, other animals would not have the symbol system to be able to hold intellectual beliefs about the afterlife, but they surely may have a type of categorizing that remembers and has feelings for the dead individual, despite the dead body. Elephants in particular have been observed to pay great attention to carcasses of con-specifics. In a study by McComb and Baker (2006) the team performed three experiments to see whether this claim is true. In the first experiment they observed the reactions to and time spent with an elephant skull, a piece of ivory, and a piece of wood. In the second, the elephants had the choice of an elephant skull, a rhino skull, or a buffalo skull. In the final, they placed three skulls of recent matriarchs in front of the elephants, only one of which was a relative. The results indicated very significant preferences for elephant skulls or ivory over other objects, and no significant difference between the matriarchs.
The researchers conclude that the elephants do have strong preferences for the dead among their species, recognizable through the ivory material. Does this study, however, automatically cancel out any chance of elephants being dualistic, as Gazzaniga claims it does? Not exactly. First of all, it may be significant that the skull of the relative is taken out of its scene-of-death context. The elephant-that-never-forgets may remember the location of a dead relative, but its actual skull (especially cleaned of any scent or body rot) may be very unrecognizable to an elephant. Humans certainly would not easily remember the skull of a loved one, but might become reverent at the sight of any human remains. Either way, there is no ruling out of a general respect for the dead among elephants that is found in very few species besides humans. And there is certainly no saying that an elephant may not be thinking “this skull once belonged to a living elephant.” It may be interesting, if anything is known about elephant brains, and whether it is actually possible or practical to give elephants brain scans, to see what parts of the brain are activated during their investigations of the dead. Particularly it would be interesting if their emotional centers were at work.
Works Cited
Gazzaniga, M.S. 2008. Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique. Harper Collins:
Joseph, R. 2001. The limbic system and the soul: Evolution and the neuroanatomy of religious experience. Zygon. 36:;105-136.
McComb, K., L. Baker, C. Moss. 2006. African elephants show high levels of interest in the skulls and ivory of their own species. Biology Letters. 2:26-28.
Wunn,
Swearing Study
We have two groups. One watches a movie during which the characters swear profusely (like The Boondock Saints), the others watch a children's movie (like The Jungle Book). Then all the participants are given an extensive survey which asks amongst other questions how often the given participants swear or use profanity. Then after the lengthy survey is completed and handed in the experimenter will accidently spill coffee all over and inform the participants that they need to re-do new surveys. We will listen for who is more likely to swear.
Emotional Suppression
James Gross and his colleagues were very interested in simulation and the emotional effect it could have on people. According to Michael Gazzaniga, they “thought that since reappraisal isn’t so cognitively taxing, it should have more positive social consequences” (Gazzaniga 186). The experiment they designed was quite simple, but it was their ability to monitor physiological reactions that proved most insightful. Groups of women who did not know each other watched a movie that would normally cause a negative reaction, and then met to discuss the film. A percentage of the women were given instructions for how to behave during their interaction. Some were told to suppress how they felt so that their responses were undetectable, others to reappraise why they felt that way so that it would not bother them, others to interact as they normally would, and all of their partners had no idea (Gazzaniga 186).
The results of this experiment were very distinct. When the woman with whom another participant was interacting was suppressing her emotional response, and only in that condition, the uninstructed woman’s blood pressure would increase noticeably (Gazzaniga 186).
Quite directly inferred by the experimenters was the fact that, “interacting with people who express little positive emotion and who are unresponsive to emotional cues actually increases the cardiovascular activity in their social partners” (Gazzaniga 186). This confirmed what Gross suspected when he hypothesized that having to focus on oneself limited one’s ability to respond to the person with which one interacts. The conscious attention that is being paid to someone not only affects the response of the person he or she is conversing with, but also similarly affects the suppresser’s physiological state. This shows how important simulation is in social interaction, because of the negative results which appear when people provide and/or receive no feedback (Gazzaniga 186).
While there is not much to dispute within the interpretation of the results of this experiment, it would be most interesting to have had the brain activity of the participants monitored during the discussions. The only concrete evidence that is provided comes from the increased cardiovascular activity. Observing the behavior of the brain as it tried to suppress emotion, or as it dealt with an unresponsive partner could provide more insights as to what areas have to do with simulation, perception, self-monitoring, and self-control.
Perhaps the most interesting thing which can be discussed with this information is the ability of people to detect and respond, even subconsciously, when the attention of others is devoted. It only serves to highlight the difficulty in successfully lying, and create a larger gap between truly listening to someone and focusing on what you are going to say next. Especially in situations where one is in emotional need of support, such as Gross’ experiment, it can be especially detrimental to refuse responding to someone.
Also very significant, for a broader outlook, is the effect of emotions and cognitive activity upon the rest of the body. This is almost a slap in the face to the mind-body discussion. If we can consciously manipulate what we reveal about our emotional state to others and manipulation (or perception of it in others) affects important physical systems in our bodies, there is an undeniable connection between emotional interactions and physical well-being. It would be interesting to evaluate children who came from unstable or emotionally depraved living situations on a variety of health standards compared with their peers from more affectionate and emotionally responsive homes.
Gazzaniga, Michael S. Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique. New York: Harper Collins, 2008. pp. 184-186.
Gross, J.J. (2002). Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences. Psychophysiology 39: 281-91.
Gross, J.J., et al. (2003). The social consequences of expressive suppression. Emotion 3: 48-67.
The results of this experiment were very distinct. When the woman with whom another participant was interacting was suppressing her emotional response, and only in that condition, the uninstructed woman’s blood pressure would increase noticeably (Gazzaniga 186).
Quite directly inferred by the experimenters was the fact that, “interacting with people who express little positive emotion and who are unresponsive to emotional cues actually increases the cardiovascular activity in their social partners” (Gazzaniga 186). This confirmed what Gross suspected when he hypothesized that having to focus on oneself limited one’s ability to respond to the person with which one interacts. The conscious attention that is being paid to someone not only affects the response of the person he or she is conversing with, but also similarly affects the suppresser’s physiological state. This shows how important simulation is in social interaction, because of the negative results which appear when people provide and/or receive no feedback (Gazzaniga 186).
While there is not much to dispute within the interpretation of the results of this experiment, it would be most interesting to have had the brain activity of the participants monitored during the discussions. The only concrete evidence that is provided comes from the increased cardiovascular activity. Observing the behavior of the brain as it tried to suppress emotion, or as it dealt with an unresponsive partner could provide more insights as to what areas have to do with simulation, perception, self-monitoring, and self-control.
Perhaps the most interesting thing which can be discussed with this information is the ability of people to detect and respond, even subconsciously, when the attention of others is devoted. It only serves to highlight the difficulty in successfully lying, and create a larger gap between truly listening to someone and focusing on what you are going to say next. Especially in situations where one is in emotional need of support, such as Gross’ experiment, it can be especially detrimental to refuse responding to someone.
Also very significant, for a broader outlook, is the effect of emotions and cognitive activity upon the rest of the body. This is almost a slap in the face to the mind-body discussion. If we can consciously manipulate what we reveal about our emotional state to others and manipulation (or perception of it in others) affects important physical systems in our bodies, there is an undeniable connection between emotional interactions and physical well-being. It would be interesting to evaluate children who came from unstable or emotionally depraved living situations on a variety of health standards compared with their peers from more affectionate and emotionally responsive homes.
Gazzaniga, Michael S. Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique. New York: Harper Collins, 2008. pp. 184-186.
Gross, J.J. (2002). Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences. Psychophysiology 39: 281-91.
Gross, J.J., et al. (2003). The social consequences of expressive suppression. Emotion 3: 48-67.
Sally, Ann, and Asch
Advanced Theory of Mind is often cited as one of the key characteristics which make humans unique. Other primates can be shown to have a lesser developed Theory of Mind, as showed by scientists at Tomasello’s lab (Gazzaniga 51) in the false-belief Sally and Ann task. The apes are at about the same level as a child before he reaches the age of four or five. In order to pass this task, the subject needs to be able to realize that one of the other participants has a false belief about the location of an object (one that the subject saw moved while the other was out of the room). This has long been a type of standard in evaluating Theory of Mind. Taking these results as precedent, it is a little disconcerting to examine Solomon Asch’s line test, which has become a classic example in social psychology. The set-up for his experiment was to plant the subject in a room with seven confederates. Essentially, the process was to show the participants series of lines, asking which one was the longest. Going down the row, one by one, each participant would answer with his or her opinion as to which was the longest, the true subject being asked last, after hearing everyone else’s answer. Asch was sure to make all of the lengths distinct, so that it would be relatively obvious which line was the longest (Gazzaniga 144).
After a series in which all of the participants were correct, Asch had his planted participants answer incorrectly, stating that the lines were of equal length, or even the opposite of their true relation. The real subject, being last in the line, would hear all of these answers and more often than not, would agree with the incorrect response (Gazzaniga 144). Psychologists tell us that the percentage who agreed changed if there was even one other person present who stated the correct answer (Aronson 242).
After discussing their performance with the experimenters, it seemed that people had different reasons for going along with the group, such as avoiding embarrassment or thinking there was something wrong with their own perception (Aronson 242). This experiment is usually interpreted in light of the field of social psychology. So the results are credited to the effect of social pressure on a person’s behavior.
There is nothing unfounded in the interpretation of these results, and since it has become a classic experiment in social psychology, it obviously has provided huge insights. It might be important though, to examine the similarity the set up of this procedure has to that of the Sally and Ann task. Some of the participants claimed to think that they themselves had false beliefs about the length of the line. However, these opinions seemed based off of their Theory of Mind which said that the others in the group had had correct opinions in the past, so perhaps the majority was right. This occurred even though the subjects thought they had seen something contradictory. Isn’t this what happens in the false-belief test? A participant who has provided consistently correct answers provides a guess which is in opposition to what the subject has seen, but those with underdeveloped Theory of Mind still say that the other is correct. Although it is not likely that apes responded incorrectly because they were embarrassed to contradict the other, they were assuming the other to be right, which seems to be a relatively simple form of what the subjects in Asch’s experiment based their answers upon. Perhaps a new indicator of Theory of Mind is in demand.
Aronson, Elliot, et al. Social Psychology. Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 2007. pp. 240-245.
Asch, S. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs 70: 1-70.
Call, J., and Tomasello, M. (1999). A nonverbal false belief task: The performance of children and great apes. Child Development 70: 381-95.
Gazzaniga, Michael S. Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique. New York: Harper Collins, 2008. pp. 51, 144.
After a series in which all of the participants were correct, Asch had his planted participants answer incorrectly, stating that the lines were of equal length, or even the opposite of their true relation. The real subject, being last in the line, would hear all of these answers and more often than not, would agree with the incorrect response (Gazzaniga 144). Psychologists tell us that the percentage who agreed changed if there was even one other person present who stated the correct answer (Aronson 242).
After discussing their performance with the experimenters, it seemed that people had different reasons for going along with the group, such as avoiding embarrassment or thinking there was something wrong with their own perception (Aronson 242). This experiment is usually interpreted in light of the field of social psychology. So the results are credited to the effect of social pressure on a person’s behavior.
There is nothing unfounded in the interpretation of these results, and since it has become a classic experiment in social psychology, it obviously has provided huge insights. It might be important though, to examine the similarity the set up of this procedure has to that of the Sally and Ann task. Some of the participants claimed to think that they themselves had false beliefs about the length of the line. However, these opinions seemed based off of their Theory of Mind which said that the others in the group had had correct opinions in the past, so perhaps the majority was right. This occurred even though the subjects thought they had seen something contradictory. Isn’t this what happens in the false-belief test? A participant who has provided consistently correct answers provides a guess which is in opposition to what the subject has seen, but those with underdeveloped Theory of Mind still say that the other is correct. Although it is not likely that apes responded incorrectly because they were embarrassed to contradict the other, they were assuming the other to be right, which seems to be a relatively simple form of what the subjects in Asch’s experiment based their answers upon. Perhaps a new indicator of Theory of Mind is in demand.
Aronson, Elliot, et al. Social Psychology. Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 2007. pp. 240-245.
Asch, S. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs 70: 1-70.
Call, J., and Tomasello, M. (1999). A nonverbal false belief task: The performance of children and great apes. Child Development 70: 381-95.
Gazzaniga, Michael S. Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique. New York: Harper Collins, 2008. pp. 51, 144.
Comparitive Frontal Lobe Size
In 1997, Katerina Semendeferi and her colleagues published their study on comparative frontal lobe sizes in the Journal of Human Evolution. The subjects whose frontal lobe sizes were determined were ten humans, six chimpanzees, three bonobos, two gorillas, four orangutans, four gibbons, and five monkeys. The number of primates exceeded the sample numbers of all previous studies of primate neuroanatomy (Gazzaniga 19).
There was not much surprise felt by the smug Homo sapiens when the results showed that their frontal lobe volumes were the largest in the group. However, it was previously supposed that the proportional size in humans would also exceed expectations, which it did not. In fact, the frontal lobe, compared to the rest of the brain, was quite similar amongst all of the test subjects (Gazzaniga 19).
The factual conclusion of what Semendeferi’s study found was that the human frontal lobe is the size that would be predicted for a brain that size among primates. Since the frontal lobe is significant to language and thought, the researchers offered a few explanations for these higher functions. The first is that the region could have been reorganized with selective cortical area enlargement. Another option is the development of increased intra and interconnectedness of neural circuits in brain sectors. There is the also the possibility for the modification of local circuitry within subsectors of the frontal lobe. Finally, subsectors could have been added or dropped as deemed most beneficial. Upon hearing these results, Todd Preuss noted that it is important to differentiate between the frontal and the prefrontal cortex (the prefrontal is further towards the front and has an extra later of neurons). He suggests that there might be a percentage difference between these two sectors, allowing the more sophisticated prefrontal cortex to comprise more of the area. Semendeferi confirms the potential in this hypothesis by mentioning that area 10, which is in the prefrontal cortex, is close to two times larger in humans than in apes (Gazzaniga 20).
At first, the results of Semendeferi’s study turn the world of common opinion on its head. When many are discovering things, such as higher intelligence and mental capabilities, which point towards the uniqueness of humanity, it is unsettling to hear that there is nothing great about the area of the human brain so involved in higher functioning. Preuss’ explanation and the final suggestion of the researchers make a lot of sense from an evolutionary standpoint – an organism minimizing or even eliminating less beneficial parts in order to maximize space available for new advantageous areas. It also maintains a closer link with apes. It is for that same reason that the lack of difference becomes a bit disconcerting. The uniqueness of Homo sapiens is in danger, if the ability for higher functioning could be realized in other apes as their prefrontal and frontal cortexes became more efficient. If the natural course of evolution produces apes with advanced language, memory, and moral abilities, it will be more difficult to classify humanity as distinct. It is more comforting to presume that the conditions which led to the development of those abilities are unique to Homo sapiens, and the possibility for them to present themselves to another species is past. Essentially, what is most adaptive for humanity is advanced intelligence, but even the “perfect” orangutan would never develop a sophisticated theory of mind. This then begs the question of what would determine that humans should be the lucky ones; which enforces the uniqueness. Yet who is to say that the intelligence developed in Homo sapiens is superior to the songs of whales? However, uniqueness has never required superiority.
Gazzaniga, Michael S. Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique. New York: Harper Collins, 2008. pp. 19-20.
Preuss, T.M. (2001). The dsicovery of cerebral diversity: An unwelcome scientific revolution. In Falk, D., and Gibson, K. (eds.), Evolutionary Anatomy of the Primate Cerebral Cortex (pp. 138-64). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Semendeferi, K., et al. (1997). The evolution of the frontal lobes: A volumetric analysis based on three-dimensional reconstructions of magnetic resonance scans of human and ape brains. Journal of Human Evolution 32: 375-88.
Semendeferi, K., et al. (2001). Prefrontal cortex in humans and apes: A comparitive study of area 10. American Journal of Physical Anthropology 114: 224-41.
There was not much surprise felt by the smug Homo sapiens when the results showed that their frontal lobe volumes were the largest in the group. However, it was previously supposed that the proportional size in humans would also exceed expectations, which it did not. In fact, the frontal lobe, compared to the rest of the brain, was quite similar amongst all of the test subjects (Gazzaniga 19).
The factual conclusion of what Semendeferi’s study found was that the human frontal lobe is the size that would be predicted for a brain that size among primates. Since the frontal lobe is significant to language and thought, the researchers offered a few explanations for these higher functions. The first is that the region could have been reorganized with selective cortical area enlargement. Another option is the development of increased intra and interconnectedness of neural circuits in brain sectors. There is the also the possibility for the modification of local circuitry within subsectors of the frontal lobe. Finally, subsectors could have been added or dropped as deemed most beneficial. Upon hearing these results, Todd Preuss noted that it is important to differentiate between the frontal and the prefrontal cortex (the prefrontal is further towards the front and has an extra later of neurons). He suggests that there might be a percentage difference between these two sectors, allowing the more sophisticated prefrontal cortex to comprise more of the area. Semendeferi confirms the potential in this hypothesis by mentioning that area 10, which is in the prefrontal cortex, is close to two times larger in humans than in apes (Gazzaniga 20).
At first, the results of Semendeferi’s study turn the world of common opinion on its head. When many are discovering things, such as higher intelligence and mental capabilities, which point towards the uniqueness of humanity, it is unsettling to hear that there is nothing great about the area of the human brain so involved in higher functioning. Preuss’ explanation and the final suggestion of the researchers make a lot of sense from an evolutionary standpoint – an organism minimizing or even eliminating less beneficial parts in order to maximize space available for new advantageous areas. It also maintains a closer link with apes. It is for that same reason that the lack of difference becomes a bit disconcerting. The uniqueness of Homo sapiens is in danger, if the ability for higher functioning could be realized in other apes as their prefrontal and frontal cortexes became more efficient. If the natural course of evolution produces apes with advanced language, memory, and moral abilities, it will be more difficult to classify humanity as distinct. It is more comforting to presume that the conditions which led to the development of those abilities are unique to Homo sapiens, and the possibility for them to present themselves to another species is past. Essentially, what is most adaptive for humanity is advanced intelligence, but even the “perfect” orangutan would never develop a sophisticated theory of mind. This then begs the question of what would determine that humans should be the lucky ones; which enforces the uniqueness. Yet who is to say that the intelligence developed in Homo sapiens is superior to the songs of whales? However, uniqueness has never required superiority.
Gazzaniga, Michael S. Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique. New York: Harper Collins, 2008. pp. 19-20.
Preuss, T.M. (2001). The dsicovery of cerebral diversity: An unwelcome scientific revolution. In Falk, D., and Gibson, K. (eds.), Evolutionary Anatomy of the Primate Cerebral Cortex (pp. 138-64). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Semendeferi, K., et al. (1997). The evolution of the frontal lobes: A volumetric analysis based on three-dimensional reconstructions of magnetic resonance scans of human and ape brains. Journal of Human Evolution 32: 375-88.
Semendeferi, K., et al. (2001). Prefrontal cortex in humans and apes: A comparitive study of area 10. American Journal of Physical Anthropology 114: 224-41.
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Human Simulation as Basis for Advertising?
Simulation may be the reason why some kinds of advertising work well. Advertising often involves people with a product. Those people, of course, are usually very happy to have that product! They are also usually young, attractive, worthy of respect and admiration, etc.
If people are very influenced by such advertisements, it may be because they are wired for simulation. The person, whether unconsciously or to some degree consciously, is possibly able to see themselves as being that happy person with the product. Thus, the person may, without realizing it, simulate the person in the commercial and buy the product.
Of course, this kind of advertisement may implicate more than just simulation. Perhaps the information in the commercial, or just the repeated emphasis on the product, is what makes the person go for the product. There would have to be an experiment that compared reactions to commercials about a product with people in them and without people.
Our particular experiment goes like this: A person is sitting at a computer screen. 75 images of mannequins wearing certain outfits will be flashed before her, for 4 seconds each. During this time period she must indicate by pressing a key whether she likes the outfit or dislikes the outfit (meaning she would or would not buy the outfit). Of course, numerous styles will be exhibited to account for the various tastes of the women!
Afterwards, she will watch 5 short commercials which show very happy and attractive women wearing 5 of the outfits she had seen. A few hours later she will be reshown the 75 images of mannequins again, but she is only given 2.5 seconds to respond with her preference this time.
Will she have changed her mind about those 5 particular outfits significantly more than the other 70?
In a follow-up survey, would she think that she had changed her mind or had been influenced by the commercials?
There may be too many variables in this experiment, and the results consequently may not implicate simulation. In addition, there may need to be a blind. Any ideas to improve this?
--Jenn & Hannah
If people are very influenced by such advertisements, it may be because they are wired for simulation. The person, whether unconsciously or to some degree consciously, is possibly able to see themselves as being that happy person with the product. Thus, the person may, without realizing it, simulate the person in the commercial and buy the product.
Of course, this kind of advertisement may implicate more than just simulation. Perhaps the information in the commercial, or just the repeated emphasis on the product, is what makes the person go for the product. There would have to be an experiment that compared reactions to commercials about a product with people in them and without people.
Our particular experiment goes like this: A person is sitting at a computer screen. 75 images of mannequins wearing certain outfits will be flashed before her, for 4 seconds each. During this time period she must indicate by pressing a key whether she likes the outfit or dislikes the outfit (meaning she would or would not buy the outfit). Of course, numerous styles will be exhibited to account for the various tastes of the women!
Afterwards, she will watch 5 short commercials which show very happy and attractive women wearing 5 of the outfits she had seen. A few hours later she will be reshown the 75 images of mannequins again, but she is only given 2.5 seconds to respond with her preference this time.
Will she have changed her mind about those 5 particular outfits significantly more than the other 70?
In a follow-up survey, would she think that she had changed her mind or had been influenced by the commercials?
There may be too many variables in this experiment, and the results consequently may not implicate simulation. In addition, there may need to be a blind. Any ideas to improve this?
--Jenn & Hannah
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